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2.2 KiB
TFSA-2020-003: Denial of service from TFLite implementation of segment sum
CVE Number
CVE-2020-15213
Impact
In TensorFlow Lite models using segment sum can trigger a denial of service by causing an out of memory allocation in the implementation of segment sum. Since code uses the last element of the tensor holding them to determine the dimensionality of output tensor, attackers can use a very large value to trigger a large allocation:
if (segment_id_size > 0) {
max_index = segment_ids->data.i32[segment_id_size - 1];
}
TfLiteIntArray* output_shape = TfLiteIntArrayCreate(NumDimensions(data));
output_shape->data[0] = max_index + 1;
for (int i = 1; i < data_rank; ++i) {
output_shape->data[i] = data->dims->data[i];
}
return context->ResizeTensor(context, output, output_shape);
Vulnerable Versions
TensorFlow 2.2.0, 2.3.0.
Patches
We have patched the issue in 204945b and will release patch releases for all affected versions.
We recommend users to upgrade to TensorFlow 2.2.1, or 2.3.1.
Workarounds
A potential workaround would be to add a custom Verifier
to limit the maximum
value in the segment ids tensor. This only handles the case when the segment ids
are stored statically in the model, but a similar validation could be done if
the segment ids are generated at runtime, between inference steps.
However, if the segment ids are generated as outputs of a tensor during inference steps, then there are no possible workaround and users are advised to upgrade to patched code.
For more information
Please consult our security guide for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.
Attribution
This vulnerability has been discovered through a variant analysis of a vulnerability reported by members of the Aivul Team from Qihoo 360.